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Quantum light sources emitting triggered single photons or entangled photon pairs have the po-
tential to boost the performance of quantum key distribution (QKD) systems. Proof-of-principle
experiments affirmed these prospects, but further efforts are necessary to push this field beyond
its current status. In this work, we show that temporal filtering of single-photon pulses enables
a performance optimization of QKD systems implemented with realistic quantum light sources,
both in experiment and simulations. To this end, we analyze the influence of temporal filtering
of sub-Poissonian single-photon pulses on the expected secret key fraction, the quantum bit er-
ror ratio, and the tolerable channel losses. For this purpose, we developed a basic QKD testbed
comprising a triggered solid-state single-photon source and a receiver module designed for four-
state polarization coding via the BB84 protocol. Furthermore, we demonstrate real-time security
monitoring by analyzing the photon statistics, in terms of g(2)(0), inside the quantum channel by
correlating the photon flux recorded at the four ports of our receiver. Our findings are useful for
the certification of QKD and can be applied and further extended for the optimization of various
implementations of quantum communication based on sub-Poissonian quantum light sources, in-
cluding device-independent schemes of QKD as well as quantum repeaters. Our work represents an
important contribution towards the development of QKD-secured communication networks based
on quantum light sources.
INTRODUCTION
Cyber security and secure data communication in gen-
eral developed as a challenge for our society as a whole
[1]. The concepts gathered in the field of quantum com-
munication [2–4] represent solutions to this challenge
and enable information theoretical secure communica-
tion. Quantum key distribution (QKD) for instance
enables the tap-proof encryption of data, by exploiting
quantum properties of light [5, 6]. The respective quan-
tum light sources ideally required for QKD, however,
had been impossible to fabricate with sufficient bright-
ness and quality for a long time. Most implementations
of QKD are therefore still implemented with attenuated
lasers, requiring so-called decoy-state protocols [7]. Dur-
ing the last decade, however, tremendous progress has
been made in the fabrication of quantum light sources.
Single-photon sources (SPSs) based on epitaxial semi-
conductor quantum dots (QDs) nowadays can be trig-
gered at GHz clock rates under pulsed-optical [8] and
-electrical [9, 10] excitation, feature high degrees of pho-
ton indistinguishability [11, 12], large photon extraction
efficiencies [10, 13, 14], and to date achieve the high-
est single-photon purity in terms of g(2)(0) compared to
any other single-photon emitter [15, 16]. Despite this
immense progress, only few proof-of-concept QKD ex-
periments have been reported based on optically [17–22]
and electrically [23, 24] operated single-photon sources.
These experiments affirmed the potential sub-Poissonian
light sources offer for QKD. To push the field of sub-
Poissonian QKD to a new level, however, further efforts
need to be undertaken. In particular practical methods
for the security analysis and certification as well as mea-
sures to improve the performance of QKD systems for a
given quantum light source need to be developed. While
Waks et al. discussed security aspects of QKD with
sub-Poissonian light sources from a theoretical viewpoint
[25], experimental studies on this important topic are still
missing.
In this work, we perform a detailed analysis on the
influence of temporal filtering of single-photon pulses on
the performance of QKD systems implemented with sub-
Poissonian light sources. For this purpose we set up a
basic QKD testbed comprising a QD-based SPS and a
receiver module designed for four-state polarization cod-
ing via the BB84 protocol. Using this Bob module in
combination with our SPS, we determine the sifted key
fraction, the quantum bit error ratio (QBER) caused by
the receiver, and the g(2)(0) of the single-photon pulses
inside the quantum channel, to finally extract the secure
key rate expected in full implementations of QKD. As
the temporal filtering of single-photon pulses differently
affects these parameters, a performance optimization of
QKD systems implemented with quantum light source is
possible. We show that optimal performance for a given
SPS can be achieved by carefully setting Bob’s accep-
tance time windows, depending on the pulse shape and
noise level. This can be either used to maximize the se-
cure key rate for a given channel loss or to extend the
maximally tolerable loss, i.e. the achievable communica-
tion distance. In addition, we demonstrate real-time se-
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2curity monitoring by analyzing the suppression of multi-
photon emission events, i.e. g(2)(0) of the single-photon
pulses inside the quantum channel during key generation.
Finally we generalize our findings by employing simula-
tions with synthetic pulse shapes, providing predictions
for different SPSs and detectors. We consider the re-
sults presented in this work an important contribution to-
wards the development of QKD-secured communication
networks based on quantum light sources. Importantly,
our approach can be easily applied and further extended
for the optimization of any implementation of quantum
communication based on sub-Poissonian quantum light
sources.
RESULTS
QKD testbed
The QKD testbed used for our experiments is illus-
trated in Fig. 1 (a). On transmitter side, Alice is rep-
resented by a triggered SPS, comprising a single pre-
selected QD embedded in a deterministically fabricated
microlens [26] providing enhanced photon collection effi-
ciency (see Methods for details). As depicted in Fig. 1 (b)
this device emits single photons at an emission wave-
length of 918 nm with low multi-photon emission prob-
ability reflected in an antibunching of g(2)(0) = 0.089 ±
0.002. The polarization state of the emitted photons is
set by a high-extinction-ratio linear-film polarizer and
a lambda-half waveplate, respectively, preparing single-
photon pulses in horizontal (H), vertical (V), diagonal
(D), and antidiagonal (A) polarization. On receiver side,
Bob comprises a four-state polarization analyzer with
passive basis choice. Single-photon counting modules
based on silicon avalanche photon diodes, time tagging
electronics and a custom made control software is used for
polarization-resolved single-photon detection, data ac-
quisition, and postprocessing. The Bob module is in-
tegrated into a portable 19-inch rackbox presented in
Fig. 1 (c) (see Methods for details). In the following,
we investigate the performance of this QKD testbed as-
suming an implementation of the BB84 protocol by ana-
lyzing the achievable QBER, single-photon purity g(2)(0)
and secret key rate.
First we investigate the limit our Bob module intro-
duces to the total QBER expected in a full implementa-
tion. For this purpose, we record the photon arrival time
distribution at the four detection channels of Bob for all
four possible input polarizations of the SPS. The corre-
sponding experimental data are shown in Fig. 1 (d) in a
matrix representation. Ideally, for a given input polariza-
tion (e.g. H) of one basis (H-V), one would expect only
detection events in the respective channel at Bob’s side
(H), while the channel with orthogonal polarization (V)
should be empty. Detection events in the other basis (D-
A) should be equally distributed, due to the statistically
random projection of the photons polarization. From the
measured matrix in Fig. 1 (d) this appears to be well re-
produced in the experiment. A closer look in Fig. 1 (d)
(right panel), however, reveals the presence of erroneous
detection events, by displaying the arrival time probabil-
ity distributions of both polarizations of the target basis.
In this representation, contributions of noise and optical
imperfections can already be qualitatively distinguished.
Correlated events in the wrong channel originate from
state discrimination imperfections caused by optical im-
perfections of Bob (e.g. finite extinction ratios of polar-
izing beamsplitters and retardance deviations of wave-
plate), while uncorrelated background events stem from
detector dark counts. The resulting QBERBob reads
QBERBob =
qpsignal
pclick︸ ︷︷ ︸
optical imperfections
+
pdc/2
pclick︸ ︷︷ ︸
dark counts
, (1)
where q denotes the error contributions due to Bob’s op-
tical imperfections, psignal is the probability to observe a
signal event, pdc the probability for a dark count event,
and pclick the overall probability for a click [25].
Performance optimization via temporal filtering
In the following, we analyze the impact of the tem-
poral filtering of the raw sifted key on the performance
of our single-photon QKD testbed. Experimentally, the
error contribution in the H-channel is calculated via
QBERHBob(∆t, tc) = NV/(NH + NV), where NH and NV
denote the number of clicks in H and V polarization, re-
spectively, detected within an acceptance time window
of width ∆t centered at time tc. Restricting the ac-
ceptance time window, the signal-to-noise-ratio can be
enhanced, as noise due to detector dark counts can be
filtered effectively [24, 27]. Fig. 2 (a) exemplarily illus-
trates the measured photon arrival time probability dis-
tributions at both detectors of the H-V basis (H-polarized
single-photon input) together with an acceptance time
window ∆t = 2.5 ns centered at the pulse maximum
(tc = 6.25 ns). Evaluating QBER
HBob(∆t, tc) by apply-
ing a temporal filter to the recorded timetags, the QBER
and the fraction F of the sifted and filtered photon de-
tection events can be extracted as a function of ∆t (see
Fig. 2 (b)). Restricting the acceptance time window ∆t
leads first of all to a reduction of the sifted key, as por-
tions of the overall signal are discarded. At the same
time the contribution of the detector dark counts is re-
duced, leading to a decrease of QBERH towards small ∆t.
At ∆t = 1.7 ns a local minimum with QBERH = 0.45%
limited by optical imperfections inside the receiver is ob-
served. Note, that the global minimum in QBERH at
∆t = 0.05 ns is not taken into account, due to the van-
ishing sifted key. The remaining three channels of the
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FIG. 1. BB84-QKD testbed using a triggered solid-state single-photon source (SPS) and polarization coding. (a) The trans-
mitter (Alice) sends single-photon pulses with fiexd polarization (H, V, D, and A) to the receiver module (Bob), comprising a
four-state polarization analyzer. (b) Photon-autocorrelation measurement of the emission of the optically triggered SPS. Inset:
Emission spectrum of the SPS, comprising a pre-selected quantum dot embedded in a photonic microlens. (c) Picture of the
Bob module integrated in a 19-inch rackbox. (d) Measured photon arrival time distributions at the four detection channels
of Bob for single-photon input-polarizations of H, V, D, and A. Measurement data are normalized to the maximum of the
respective input state. The right panel shows the two data sets for a given input polarization basis (e.g. HH and HV) for
each input state normalized to the photon arrival probability distributions, revealing erroneous detection events due to optical
imperfections in Bob.
Bob module show similar behavior (see Supplementary
Note 1). The temporal filtering, however, does not only
affect the QBER and the sifted key fraction. The pho-
ton statistics of the quantum light source needs to be
taken into account for a security analysis as well. The
multi-photon probability pm inside the quantum channel
is governed by g(2)(0) via
pm ≤ µ
2g(2)(0)
2
. (2)
For the antibunching relevant for QKD, only the fraction
of the detection events has to be taken into account
which are used for secret key distillation in the end.
Therefore we evaluate the photon-autocorrelation g(2)(τ)
from the raw recorded timetags of all four detection
channels after applying the temporal filter to the data
(see Fig. 2 (c)). The corresponding g
(2)
∆t (0) extracted
from the temporally filtered timetags (see Methods) is
displayed in Fig. 2 (d) as a function of ∆t. Narrowing
the temporal filter, the antibunching improves from
0.103 ± 0.009 at ∆t = 12.50 ns to 0.016 ± 0.007 at
∆t = 1.1 ns. Note, that this approach has to be well dis-
tinguished from most other reports, where postselected
values of g(2)(0) are generated based on the cutting of
g(2)(τ) after performing the correlation measurement
using all photon detection events. In contrast, our
routine only considers photon detection events used for
secure key distillation in the end, which is more precise.
In addition, background subtraction of coincidences due
to detector dark counts, residual laser emission [29] or
the sample emission other than the quantum emitter
itself [30–32] is often used to explain the non-ideal
g(2)(0). Clearly such approaches are not meanigful for
implementations of QKD, since in general detection
events arising from noise can not be differentiated from
the signal ones. Still these consideration can be useful
to underline the potential a given quantum light source
offers.
Exploiting temporal filtering as discussed above,
the overall performance of a QKD implementation
based on single-photon sources can be optimized as we
will demonstrate in the following. For this purpose, a
trade-off needs to be found between low QBER and low
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FIG. 2. The effect of temporal filtering on key parameters of
QKD (exemplary shown for H input polarization). (a) Photon
arrival time probability distributions of H-photons detected in
the H-channel (blue) and H-photons detected in the V-channel
(orange). Applying temporal filtering, noise due to detector
dark counts can be reduced. (b) QBER and sifted key fraction
F as a function of the acceptance time window width ∆t for
fixed window center tc. (c) Impact of the temporal filtering on
the g(2)(0) of our single-photon source. Each correlation his-
togram g(2)(τ) is calculated from the raw recorded timetags of
all four detection channels after applying the temporal filter to
the data for an evaluation time of 180 s. This evaluation time
corresponds to the first data point in Fig. 4 (b). (d) g(2)(0)
as a function of ∆t.
g(2)(0) on the one hand, and high sifted key fractions
on the other hand. In addition, a symmetric temporal
filter as chosen above is not sufficient in general, due to
the asymmetry in the photon arrival time distribution of
the single-photon pulses. To this end, we perform a two-
dimensional (2D) analysis by varying the temporal width
∆t and the center tc of the acceptance time window.
The 2D analysis is performed for the QBERHBob(∆t, tc),
the sifted fraction FHBob(∆t, tc), and the antibunching
g(2)(0,∆t, tc) (see Supplementary Note 2 and 3). From
these quantities, we finally extract the normalized secret
key rate S(∆t, tc) expected in a full implementation of
BB84 QKD according to [17]
R =
pclick
2
(βτ(e)− f(e)h(e)) . (3)
Here, the factor 1/2 stems from the sifting procedure,
pclick is the click-rate on the detectors, e the QBER, β the
fraction of the detection events caused by single photons,
τ(e) the compression function accounting for Eve’s pos-
sible attacks, h(e) the binary Shannon-entropy, and f(e)
the error correction efficiency [25]. The expected back-
to-back secret key rate calculated from Eq. 3 is presented
in Fig. 3 (a). A small ∆t leads to a small QBER but also
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FIG. 3. Optimization of single-photon QKD exploiting tem-
poral filtering of realistic quantum light sources. (a) Expected
secret key rate fraction S(∆t, tc) as a function of the temporal
width ∆t and the center tc of the acceptance time window.
For the analysis the QBER, the sifted key fraction and the
g(2)(0) were considered in a two-dimensional parameter space
(∆t,tc) (see Supplementary Note 3). Grey areas indicate pa-
rameters where no secret key can be extracted. (b) Rate-loss
diagram considering our experimental data from Fig. 2 (d) for
different values of ∆t. Choosing optimized settings for the ac-
ceptance time window, the tolerable loss inside the quantum
channel can be enhanced by 23% in case of our SPS.
to a small sifted fraction. An acceptance window within
5a region governed by noise does not allow for a secret key
distribution at all. The optimal value for our measure-
ment does only need to discard a small part of the signal.
Depending on the length of the single-photon pulses and
the detector noise level, however, temporal filtering can
have crucial impact on the resulting back-to-back secure
key, as demonstrated in simulations discussed further be-
low.
The secure communication distance achievable with a
given QKD system is of superior importance. Based on
the secret key analysis performed in Fig. 3 (a), we cal-
culated the rate-loss dependencies accounting for our ex-
perimental conditions (see Methods). Fig. 3 (b) illus-
trates the expected secret key per pulse as a function
of the losses inside the quantum channel for different
temporal filters. In the low-loss regime (< 20 dB) op-
timum back-to-back performance is achieved for our SPS
by using the full acceptance time window (∆t = 12.5 ns),
as already discussed above. The maximal tolerable loss,
however, is limited to 28.35 dB in this case. Applying
a temporal filter, the achievable maximal tolerable loss
inside the quantum channel can be enhanced to almost
35 dB for an optimized filter setting (∆t = 1.1 ns), which
corresponds to a QKD range extension of 23%. This
transmission range extension is possible due to the im-
provement in signal-to-noise ratio and the reduced multi-
photon probability g(2)(0) resulting from the temporal
filtering (see Supplementary Note 4). Assuming a single-
photon source of similar performance with an emission
wavelength of 1310 nm and 1550 nm, respectively, exten-
sions for the secure communication distance by 21.3 km
(to a distance of 112.8 km) and 38.9 km (to a distance
of 205.6 km) are expected, for state-of-the-art single-
mode fiber (Corning SMF28-ULL) with 0.31 dB/km and
0.17 dB/km at 1310 nm and 1550 nm, respectively.
Importantly, the optimization routine presented above
can be adapted and extended for most other applications
in quantum communication employing realistic quantum
light sources, including future implementations of multi-
user quantum networks based on measurement device-
independent QKD [33] or multi-dimensional memory-
based quantum repeaters [34].
Real-time photon statistics monitoring
In future QKD-secured networks implemented with
quantum light sources, g(2)(0) inside the quantum chan-
nel needs to be monitored in real time to enable secret
key distillation. Moreover, any temporal filtering applied
to the detected photons on Bob’s side needs to be applied
to the photon statistics as well. So far, in most reports on
single-photon QKD, the g(2)(0) used for the security anal-
ysis has been measured separately from the key trans-
mission, using for instance a Hanbury-Brown and Twiss
setup on Alice’s side. Applying our approach for the op-
timization via temporal filtering presented above, we are
able to monitor g(2)(0) in real-time and for each block
used for secret key distillation. For this purpose, we con-
ducted a proof-of-principle experiment by recording time
tags over a period of 90 minutes with fixed input polar-
ization H of our SPS. The photon statistics g(2)(τ) are
evaluated every 180 s (non-overlapping blocks) by corre-
lating the time tags of all four detection channels of Bob.
The resulting time traces for g(2)(0) and the sifted key
are presented in Fig. 4.
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FIG. 4. Real-time security monitoring for single-photon
QKD. (a) Clicks recorded in all four detection channels of
Bob for H-polarized single-photons as input. (b) Antibunch-
ing g(2)(0) of our SPS evaluated via correlating the time tags
of all four detection channels in non-overlapping blocks of
180 s length.
Via the monitoring of g(2)(0), the quantum optical prop-
erties of our SPS can be tested continuously during se-
cret key distillation. This approach, which has previously
been used only for coherent and bunched light sources
[35, 36], is able to reveal changes in the transceiver mod-
ule or eavesdropping attacks inducing changes in the pho-
ton statistics.
Simulations
To extend the scope of our approach for the perfor-
mance optimization of single-photon QKD systems be-
yond the specific properties of our testbed, we addition-
ally performed simulations on the secret key fraction ex-
pected for different single-photon sources and detectors.
For this purpose, we modeled the photon arrival time
distributions of the single-photon pulses with a synthetic
pulse shape and varied the decay time constant as well
as the noise level (see Methods). For the sake of clarity,
6we limit ourselves to four regimes: (1) Low noise and
short lifetime, (2) high noise and short lifetime, (3) low
noise and long lifetime, and (4) high noise and long life-
time, with short and long referring to the clock-rate. The
simulation results for the secret key fraction S(∆t, tc) are
presented in a two-dimensional parameter space in Fig. 5,
assuming an ideal single-photon source (g(2)(0) = 0). In
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FIG. 5. Simulated back-to-back secret key rates achievable via
temporal filtering for different pulse lengths and noise levels:
(a) Low noise and long pulse (b) high noise and short pulse (c)
low noise and long pulse, as well as (d) high noise and long
pulse. Careful adjustment of the acceptance time windows
results in a maximum in the secret key (see markers).
all four cases the temporal filtering enables one to find an
optimal trade-off between sifted-key and QBER. Hence
the secret key rate can be maximized by correctly choos-
ing the settings of the temporal filter, resulting in a per-
formance optimization of the QKD system. The gain in
secret key rate compared to the case without applying a
temporal filter is 2.5 % in case (1), 184.5 % in case (2),
6.0 % in case (3), and 248.3 % in case (4). Substantial
improvements are achieved in the cases with high noise
levels ((2) and (4)), corresponding to the regime of high
transmission channel losses. Therefore, the optimization
via temporal filtering becomes particular important in
long distance QKD with noisy detectors. Using state-
of-the-art superconducting single-photon detectors [37],
the noise can be drastically reduced [38]. Many practical
QKD scenarios, however, will not be able to provide the
infrastructure for liquid-helium or closed-cycle refrigera-
tors required for these detectors to date.
DISCUSSION
We have demonstrated that temporal filtering of
single-photon pulses is a viable tool to optimize the
performance of QKD implementations based on sub-
Poissonian quantum light sources. Using a basic QKD
testbed comprising a solid-state based triggered SPS and
a receiver module for four-state polarization coding, we
showed that carefully setting the acceptance time win-
dows enables one to maximize the achievable back-to-
back secure key rate or the maximally tolerable transmis-
sion loss inside the quantum channel. Our optimization
routine is particular beneficial in the high loss regime
characteristic for long distance QKD. Additionally, we
showed real-time security monitoring by evaluating the
photon statistics of our SPS in terms of g(2)(0) during
the key generation.
The routines developed in our work with a basic BB84-
QKD testbed are readily applicable for various imple-
mentations of quantum communication employing realis-
tic quantum light sources, including measurement device-
independent QKD and quantum repeaters, and are useful
for certification of QKD [39]. Furthermore, the tempo-
ral filtering and real-time monitoring of sub-Poissonian
light pulses opens up new possibilities for improving the
performance taking detection flaws into account. Using
SPSs for QKD, an attacker is forced to use a SPS as well.
This in turn reduces the penalty on the achievable secret
key rate taking detection flaws into account [40]. Even
advanced non-linear attacks influencing or even control-
ling the photon statistics inside the quantum channel can
be detected, by additionally monitoring g(2)(0) on Alice’
side. With respect to full implementations of QKD, fur-
ther extensions are required, taking side-channel attacks
[24, 41] or finite-key effects [42] into account. As the tem-
poral filtering reduces the amount of key material that
can be generated, finite-key size effects are getting in-
creasingly important.
METHODS
Single-Photon Source
The SPS on Alice’ side comprises a single pre-selected
InGaAs/GaAs QD embedded in a monolithic microlens
above a bottom distributed Bragg reflector, both of which
increase the photon collection efficiency from the QD.
Details on the sample and its deterministic fabrication
can be found elsewhere [26, 43]. The SPS was mounted
into a closed-cycle refrigerator integrated in a cryooptical
table (Model attoDRY800, attocube systems AG) for op-
erating the SPS at a temperature of 4.2 K. An aspheric
lens (NA = 0.77) inside the cryostat collected the QD
emission, which was optically triggered at 80 MHz repe-
tition rate using quasi-resonant excitation into the QD’s
7p-shell via a pulsed (2 ps pulse width) tunable laser sys-
tem (picoEmerald, APE GmbH). Single-photon emission
from the QD was spectrally filtered via an edge-pass filter
and a monochromator coupled to a polarization main-
taining single-mode fiber (PM 98-U25D) connected to
the receiver module Bob. Here, the polarization of the
single-photon pulses is set using a high-extinction-ratio
linear-film polarizer followed by a lambda-half waveplate
for aligning Alice’ and Bob’s polarization axes.
Receiver Module Bob
The receiver module Bob contains a four-state polar-
ization analyzer with passive basis choice. Here, the
stream of single-photon pulses is split by a non-polarizing
50:50 beamsplitter (BS) followed by a polarizing beam-
splitter (PBS) in the first output and a lambda-half wave-
plate combined with another PBS in the second output.
Thus the four BB84 states (H-, V-, D-, and A-polarized
photons) are routed in four different output ports, each
comprising a fiber-collimator with attached optical mul-
timode fiber (FG050LGA, Thorlabs GmbH). The pho-
tons are detected using four single-photon counting mod-
ules (COUNT-T100-FC, Laser Components GmbH) with
a timing jitter between 500 ps and 600 ps. The single-
photon detection events are converted to four streams of
time tags (1 ps digital resolution) using a time-to-digital
converter (TDC) (quTag, qutools GmbH) synchronized
to the excitation laser.
Postprocessing
To process the timetags from the receiver module, a
homemade software package was developed (based on
LabVIEW and Rust), in order to extract the sifted key
fraction, the QBER, and the antibunching value g(2)(0)
as explained in the following. First, temporally filtered
data sets were processed from the raw timetags by dis-
carding events outside the specified acceptance time win-
dows of width ∆t and center tt. For this purpose, slight
temporal delays within Bob had to be compensated us-
ing electronic delays build in the TDC electronics. Af-
terwards the parameters mentioned above were extracted
from the temporally filtered data sets. The QBER was
calculated from the photon arrival time distributions as
well as the sifted key. The photon statistics g(2)(τ) were
evaluated in a ∆τ = 250 ns-wide delay window, by cor-
relating the timetags from the four detection channels of
Bob. From the resulting g(2)(τ) histograms, g(2)(0) was
calculated via g(2)(0) = Aτ=0Aτ 6=0 , where Aτ=0 denotes the
the integrated area of the peak at zero time delay and
Aτ 6=0 the average area of the side peaks. The standard
error of g(2)(0) is deduced via Gaussian error propaga-
tion, taking into account σ(Aτ=0) =
√
Aτ=0 as well as
the standard deviation of the areas from the side peaks.
For illustrations in this work, a time-bin width of 25 ps
and 250 ps were chosen for the photon arrival time dis-
tributions and g(2)(τ) histograms, respectively.
Simulations
For the simulations the photon arrival time distribu-
tions of the single-photon pulses were modeled with syn-
thetic pulse shapes using an exponential decay convo-
luted with a Gaussian of 500 ps FWHM, accounting for
the temporal response function of the detection appara-
tus. Two types of QD-SPSs are considered: The first
one resembles an QD with a radiative lifetime of 1.5 ns
(long pulse) and the second one with a lifetime of 0.5 ns
(short pulse). The optical imperfections in the second
channel were modeled by the same distribution scaled
to 1 %. The finite signal-to-noise-ratio (noise level) was
considered by an uncorrelated offset of 0.01 per bin for
low noise and 0.3 per bin for high noise, corresponding
to signal-to-noise ratios of 392 and 13 in the input po-
larization channel. To account for effects arising from
the overlap of consecutive pulses, a temporal window of
12.5 ns width was used from a train of three consecutive
pulses.
The expected loss-dependent secret key in Fig. 3 (b)
was calculated via Eq. 3 using estimated parameters
extracted from our measurement data (see Supplemen-
tary Note 2). Cumulative detector dark counts of 100 Hz
without temporal filtering were considered, leading to
pdc = 1.2 · 10−6. The mean photon number was esti-
mated from the setup efficiency to be µ ≈ 0.0043.
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S1
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
Note 1: Measurement data for QBER and signal fraction for each polarization
The most simple temporal filter comprises an acceptance time window centered at the maximum of the photon
arrival time distribution. For light sources with a symmetric distribution this is sufficient. For the asymmetric
temporal shape of quantum emitters, arising from their spontaneous radiative decay, however, this is not sufficient
(see Supplementary Note 3).
From the photon arrival time distributions of Fig. 1 (d) in the main text the QBER for all four possible input
polarizations is calculated (see Fig. S1). Reducing the size of the acceptance time window, we expect a decrease in
QBER due to the improvement in signal-to-noise ratio. This is observed for the V and A polarization. The minimum
QBER is achieved at ∆t = 0.2 ns and ∆t = 0.05 ns, respectively. The slope is correlated to the shape of photon
arrival time distribution. The measurement for the H polarization shows a slightly different behavior. Here, a local
minimum at ∆t = 1.7 ns is observed. This discrepancy most probably arises from the fact, that the four single-photon
detectors used in our experiments slightly differ in their properties (e.g. temporal jitter), which needs to be taken
into account in the security analysis in full implementations of QKD. Another discrepancy is observed for the D input
polarization. The minimal achievable value QBERD is reached for an acceptance window of ∆t = 5.3 ns. In addition,
the low extinction ratio in reflection of the polarizing beam splitter in the D/A-basis leads to a high QBER.
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FIG. S1. The effect of temporal filtering on the QBER and Fraction of the overall signal for each polarization.
Note 2: Parameter estimation for calculating the expected secret key rates
The expected key rates R in Fig. 3 (b) in the main text are calculated from equation of [25]:
R =
pclick
2
(βτ(e)− f(e)h(e)) . (4)
with the binary Shannon entropy h(e) = −e log2(e) − (1 − e) log2(1 − e). The parameters used for the calculation
stem from the long-term measurement for fixed H input polarization. The extraction from this data is described
in the following for the mean photon number µ, the detection rate pclick and detector dark count probability pdc.
The parameters are summarized in Table S1. The mean photon number µ at Alice’s output was calculated from the
clock frequency of the excitation laser (80 MHz), the setup efficiency and the mean detector count rate on all four
detectors during the measurement. This results a mean photon number µ = 0.0043. This already low value does not
allow for further optimization of µ as in [25]. The detector dark counts can be estimated by two ways. Shielding the
detectors from all incoming light results in a cumulative dark count rate of below 100 Hz. For taking into account the
S2
Relevant parameter Symbol Value
Mean Photon number µ 0.0043
Dark count probability pdc 1.22 · 10−6
TABLE S1. Parameters for the estimation of the expected secret key rates.
detectors breakdown flash and reflection of the optics during the operation, a second method is implied to estimate
the dark count rate in the laboratory environment. The events in the D channel are summed up in a region governed
by noise and divided by the measurement time. This does also result in an overall dark count rate of 100 Hz. For the
acceptance window of 12.5 ns this leads to pdc = 1.22 · 10−6.
Note 3: Impact of 2D temporal filtering on the performance of single-photon QKD
For signal pulses which are asymmetric in the temporal domain, the acceptance time-windows for QKD need to be
adjusted in two dimensions using its width ∆t and its center position tc. In Figure 3 (a) of the main text, we present
the secret key rate S(∆t, tc) in this 2D parameter space. Supplementary Figure S2 depicts the complementing data
for the signal fraction, the QBER, the g(2)(0), and the resulting secret key rate.
Note 4: Impact of temporal filtering on the achievable communication distance
As mentioned in the discussion of Figure 3 (b), temporal filtering can be exploited to enhance the signal-to-noise
ratio resulting in enhanced tolerable losses in single-photon QKD. Figure S3 for clarity depicts the tolerable losses, the
QBER, and g(2)(0) as a function of the width ∆t of the acceptance time window (at fixed center position ∆t = 6.25 ns).
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FIG. S2. The effect of 2D temporal filtering on key parameters of QKD: Fraction of signal, QBER, g(2)(0), and therefrom
estimated secret key rate for realistic-SPS from Eq. (4). The white regions in the g(2)(0) parameter map indicate parameters
where the autocorrelation could not be evaluated. The white regions in the secret key rate map indicate parameters for which
no secret key can be extracted.
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FIG. S3. Effect of temporal filtering on the tolerable loss in single-photon QKD (for fixed tc = 6.25 ns). Reducing the acceptance
time window’s width ∆t results in an enhanced signal-to-noise ratio as indicated by improved QBER and g(2)(0). This leads
to enhancement of the tolerable loss and therefore to an extension of the achievable communication distance.
